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The Past and Future of 
Agricultural Communications: 
Part II: Looking Ahead 
John E. Ross 
Somehow, to me, 1908 seems closer to this moment than 
does 2058. The year 1908 has a comfortable sound to it. 
Although we know that things have changed radically since 
then, we can imagine what life was like after the turn of the 
century-and that recollection does not se~m intolerable. 
But 2058 seems very unfamiliar. We know not at all what 
that year holds for us, perhaps more accurately for our 
children and theirs. 
Predictions about 2058 are problematic, but we can assess 
some recent dramatic changes and therefore imagine what 
forces will be at work over the next 75 years. 
At this point, I want to state a word about my construct of 
communication and journalism. Communication is a process. 
Words and pictures are means to an end. Meaning resides in 
the content of the communication. It is true, however, that 
comprehension is a function of both content and style. To 
understand the role and impact of communication, we must 
consider both content and style. They are, fundamentally, 
inseparable. 
Therefore if we look ahead to assess the role of com-
munication, we need to consider what is happening substan-
tively in our society-in our civilization-as well as the 
engineering innovations in communications, as startling as 
those now are. 
The opening plenary session of the 1983 National ACE 
Conference in Madison, Wis., in July took note of the 75th 
anniversary of the Department of Agricultural Journalism 
at UW~Madison. Bryant Kearl took a look at the past (Oct~ 
Dec '83 Quarterly); John E. Ross, professor of agricultural 
journalism and environmental communications, addressed 
what the next 75 years might hold in store for agricultural 
communicators. 
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To lay this foundation , I would like to trace two sets of con-
temporary phenomena: 
One-some social and economic demographics of our time. 
Two-some technical discoveries of our time. 
I will limit my examples to those I consider the most 
important. 
The Shape of Our Times 
I believe that the most singular demographic characteristic 
of our time-of our century-iS world human population 
growth. The increase in population prescribes most other 
policies and programs, certainly food production. If it does not 
immediately prescribe our actions, it refuses to leave even the 
periphery of our vision-as a fundamental issue. 
World population in 1908 was somewhere in the area of 1.5 
billion. In 1981 world population reached 4.567 billion, with an 
annual growth rate of 1.7 percent. As recent as 1975, world 
population was 4.146 billion, with a growth rate of 2.2 per-
cent. Thus, there is evidence of a decline in the rate of 
growth. Rates of growth can, however, be deceptive. In 1970 
there were 70 million additional people. In 1983 there will be 
78 million additional people. The annual increment will con-
tinue to increase because of the pyramidal structure of 
population. In the 1970's global economiC growth rates 
averaged around 1.6 percent, so, in that time period, 
economic development did not match population growth. 
But let's assume that the demographic transition is not a 
myth, that world development will pick up again, and that the 
population growth rate will drop by half-to 1 percent, aver-
aged over coming years. That would give us a world popula-
tion of around 9 billion in our targeted year of 2058. 
Whatever happens to the rates of growth, as the decades 
slide by, we will need to intensify our food production. There 
are wide variations on the estimates of untapped arable 
lands. Some say we could increase the land surface in food 
production by as much as 50 percent. Any new lands in pro-
duction will require large capital and large energy in-
vestments. My feeling is that the pressure will be differentially 
large on lands currently in production. 
It also appears that worldwide we are now lOSing about 15 
billion tons of topsoil from cropland per year, which is about a 
5 percent loss per decade. The agriculturally-caused erosion 
appears to be running at about three times that we would ex-
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pect from natural situations. There is disagreement on the 
yield equivalency of soil erosion. One figure is that an inch of 
soil equals about a 6 percent loss in wheat. 
Whatever pathway to increased food production, it seems 
that a minimum is to double the output in the next 75 years. 
Currently, population growth in the U.S., including migra-
tion, is at 1.1 percent a year. At that rate population in the 
U.S. would be approaching 500 million in 2058. Perhaps that 
rate will not be sustained here, or it could go higher. It seems 
inevitable to me that proportionately more of our food produc-
tion will be consumed at home, unless substantial yield in-
creases lie ahead in our economy. It cannot be ignored that 
there are about 18 million refugees in the world, that is, in-
dividuals who have fled their homelands into another nation. 
A second singular characteristic of our time is the recogni-
tion that petroleum, here defined as fluid oil, is a finite 
resource. There is now considerable consensus ,in the predic-
tion literature that the remaining petroleum resource tops out 
in the area of 1,660 billion barrels. In 1977 annual petroleum 
production totaled 21.7 billion barrels. Since 1970 there has 
been a 12 percent decline in the annual production of 
petroleum. Most forecasters explain this as a combination of 
conservation, substitutions, and inflation. Per capita consump-
tion of petroleum in the U.S. is off about 17 percent. But, us-
ing the 1977 production figure, if you divide the annual pro-
duction into the estimates of the resource, petroleum would 
be gone-all of it-in just over 76 years. 
Obviously, it won't happen that way. The petroleum produc-
tion curve will be skewed, and in the later years, most of it 
will be used for petrochemicals, at a very high price per bar-
rel. World petroleum production is now estimated to peak in 
the early 1990's. Of the current remaining stock, some 929 
billion barrels, or approximately 56 percent of the total, is in 
the ground in the Arab countries of the Mideast, plus Russia 
and China. The U.S. moved over to the back side of its 
petroleum production curve over 10 years ago. 
Predictions for na~ural gas are somewhat more optimistic. 
We still appear to be on the upswing in discoveries. However, 
the online capacity to produce natural gas at least in North 
America is currently much closer to demand than is oil. 
The U.S. energy consumption budget is still nearly 70 per-
cent based in oil and natural gas, in spite of two major price 
shock waves in the 1970's. Agriculture in the U.S., at this 
point, is still fundamentally dependent on petroleum and 
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natural gas. Real costs of these fuels will escalate again after 
the 1980's plateau. We clearly face a major shift away from 
petroleum, I think well within this century. And that will hap-
pen at the time when we will be trying to double food 
production. 
Petroleum has been very cheap. And it has had the ob-
vious advantage of natural liquidity, making it ideal for fueling 
moving vehicles, including tractors. But the end 01 the era of 
petroleum approaches. Interestingly that era will have closely 
coincided with the 150 years between 1908 and 2058. 
A third characteristic of our time concerns the radical 
change in the structure of capitalism. 
It should be noted that the U.S., Japan, West Germany, 
France and the United Kindgom now produce half the world's 
output of goods and services. 
Capitalist societies show four lines of change: 
First, they have grown from agricultural and commercial 
economies to industrial ones, and in recent years the service 
sector of most of them has become more important than the 
industrial sector. Seventy-five years ago, two thirds of the 
U.S. labor force was employed in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing. Today, these three employ 4 percent. Assuming full 
employment, manufacturing, mining, construction, and 
transportation now employ 34 percent; services and 
government-36 percent; trade, finance and real estate-26 
percent. 
Second, the ownership and control of capital goods have 
become concentrated in fewer hands. Seventy-five years ago, 
35 percent of manufacturing assets were h91d by the largest 
100 manufacturing corporations in the U.S. That figure is now 
48 percent. Below this level, concentration also proceeds. 
Third, the number of wage earners has risen manyfold com-
pared to the number of self-employed. Wage earners have 
become assembled in ever larger working units. Seventy-five 
years ago, 40 percent were self-employed. Only 6 percent are 
now self-employed. There are a number of farmers who at 
least imagine themselves self-employed. But as capitalism 
has centralized, self-employed farmers' control over economic 
forces, and thus their ability to make autonomous decisions, 
has diminished. 
Fourth, central governments have become increasingly im-
plicated in what used to be strictly private affairs of capitalist 
enterprise. Government actions emerge as monetary policy, 
as fiscal policy, and as regulatory policy. 
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John Kenneth Galbraith , in his book, "The New Industrial 
State, " argues that we have entered a stage of capitalism 
where information and organization are the most important 
economic goods, replacing , first, control of resources and 
second, c'ontrol of capital. In this model the crucial power to 
make decisions is passing to teams of specialists with great 
expertise. If Galbraith is correct, this is a most fundamental 
shift. 
In a book titled " Resources and Development," I have 
argued that the need for information increases as a function 
of the rate of growth of the capital enterprise. If growth is pro-
ceeding at an exponential rate , exponentially increasing infor-
mation is required to support the organizational structure. 
Thus, the trend toward information services and professional 
expertise is not a spontaneous condition of this century. 
Rather it is woven into and is a response to the changes in 
the economy. 
I see no forces in the near future that would slow or 
reverse these trends in capitalism, primarily the concentration 
of resources in larger economic units . For example, recently 
the U.S. government has removed restrictions on the ag-
gregation of private financial institutions, and we will , in the 
years immediately ahead, see a rapid concentration of bank 
ownership. The trend toward larger economy of scale has not, 
in my judgment. run its course. This emerging capitalism will 
continue to have profound impact on the economic structure 
of food production and on energy production. 
The Shape of Things to Come 
World population growth and its implications for food pro-
duction, the shifting kaleidoscope of energy supply, and the 
increasing scale of capitalism are among the important forces 
that will shape the coming decades. And their momentum, I 
think, will demand certain kinds of responses from policy 
makers, educators, and information specialists. 
First, there will be a demand for improved forecasts-that 
is, in our ability to predict future resources supplies, in the 
basics like minerals, fuels, arable land capacity, and water, 
and also in forecasting economic trends and the stability of 
production. A major new thrust in economic forecasting will 
be risk assessment. There will be increasing concern over 
possible limitations of natural resources and the extent to 
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which pollution would act as a limiting factor in development. 
Second, there will be a demand for longer periods of ad-
vanced planning. There is already considerable evidence of 
the need to make earlier commitments for specific 
developmental plans and there is evidence of pressure on the 
political process to reduce risks well into the future. In other 
words, pluralism and incrementalism in politics will be increas-
ingly hard to maintain. An example of the increasing demand 
for long-range planning in all its aspects is the development 
of the Rocky Mountain coal fields. It is safe to predict that 
future development of these coal fields will proceed much 
faster than general economic growth. Hopefully, this develop-
ment will be anticipated well in advance of crises. 
It is important to emphasize again that forecasting and 
planning have voracious appetites for information, and for ex-
pertise in information processing. 
There are now before the U.S. Congress three different bills 
that would strengthen our foresight capability. Some would 
describe this as planning, but the term foresight capability im-
plies more, that is, an ability to develop scenarios based on 
phenomena like population, energy, and economic potential. 
Note that the term also avoids forecasting per se. It seems 
that we are entering a period of declining confidence in the 
ability of the market to anticipate the future. It is not just addi-
tional information that is sought, but the ability to integrate 
the information across disciplines and across time. But we 
still have some doubts about planning and forecasting. 
Three Key Shapers of the Future 
Now, I would like to turn to some technical discoveries that 
will shape other issues. To me, three stand above the others: 
These are (1) the understanding of atomic structure, (2) the 
. understanding of the molecular structure of life, and (3) the 
microprocessing of information. 
It is fascinating that all three of these deal with complexities 
at the microscopic or submicroscopic level, below the level of 
direct sensory experience, in worlds not surmised by our 
grandparents. 
These technical developments also have several levels of 
meaning. The first meaning is in the marvel of the scientific 
revelation itself. 
Second are the economic and social implications of the 
developments in specific and pragmatic ways. 
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Third is the potential to control and enhance the environ-
ment of humans in general ways that would have seemed 
utterly impossible 75 years ago. 
In the understanding of the atom, the most obvious 
pragmatic implication is the release of vast amounts of 
energy, we hope in the sane and safe way. The controlled fu-
sion of hydrogen, for example, could bypass the burning of 
hydrocarbons with all the environmental negatives that carbon 
imposes upon us, and could also make unnecessary the fis-
sion of the heavy elements with their concomitant dangers. 
Off in the future lies the answer to whether or not we will 
solve the technical problems of controlled fusion , and more 
importantly, whether or not we can achieve a net gain in 
energy. Fusion optimists say it can happen before 2058. 
Others urge that we rely on the uncontrolled fusion of 
hydrogen in the sun and its unrelenting stream of photons. 
As bright as these alternatives seem, to achieve t~e collec-
tion and distribution networks of controlled fusion on earth are 
formidable engineering goals. For example, if the process we 
adopt is to magnetically contain the fusion reaction, then de-
mand for copper in the magnets could be immense. A major 
shift to solar energy, 40 or 50 years from now, might result in 
a dramatic reversal away from large economy of scale, 
because this form of energy, unlike the hydrocarbons, is 
uniformly distributed across the earth, and unlike nuclear 
reaction, does not require multimegawatt fortresses of genera-
tion. Manipulated solar energy has immense implications for 
agriculture. 
So does my second example of technical discoveries-the 
understanding of the molecular structure of life. While there is 
still much to learn in this area, the foundations of its basic 
simplicity appear to be well understood. And we are well 
along in understanding its complexities, that is, the infinity of 
potential combinations. Further, we expect to be able to 
understand the switching and control mechanisms. 
Implicit in the understanding of DNA, as with understanding 
of the atom, is the possibility of manipulation of that structure. 
While that manipulation will affect us in many ways, it is 
enough to mention a few examples in agriculture. 
For example, there is the established fact of cloning, or 
replicating, already improved strains at the gamete or the 
zygote level , the improved strains having been developed by 
more traditional processes of systematic, but still natural 
selection. While we almost take this for granted in plants, we 
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are more startled over its application for animals. tor example. 
dairy cows. Given artificial insemination, a high-quality bull 
can father 250,000 calves. Imagine cloning a super-bull in 
multiples of two or four, which could generate up to a million 
offspring. There are now about 11 million dairy cows-total-
in the U.S. 
There is also the immediate possibility of plagiarizing the 
expression of genetic material and mass producing various 
natural chemicals that act as control agents or defense 
mechanisms-in other words, pharmaceuticals. 
We have, at least in one case, introduced specific genes 
from one species or strain into another, with the genetic trait 
being transferred to a succeeding generation. We know that 
viruses and bacteria shuttle genes around under natural con-
ditions from host to host. The pragmatic idea is, of course, to 
direct this shuttle operation. 
It may be possible also to construct and then introduce syn-
thetic traits into living systems. Such traits would then come 
from the fabrics of our imaginations. 
These techniques would perform the function of multiplying 
quality, of enhancing defenses, or of broadening a natural en-
vironmental niche for a strain or species. 
Considering information as applied to molecular structure, 
we deduce two things. First, structure is governed by informa-
tion. In its most basic form, we have a genetic code. Use of 
the word code is more than symbolic. it is indeed an informa-
tion code. Second, while the rudiments of the code are sim-
ple, the environment in which life is embedded is very com-
plex. Therefore, to engineer good breeding will require an 
understanding of the particular code expressed in a trait, but, 
more importantly, an understanding of the environmental 
milieu that results in a particular behavior. One could con-
ceive of genetic manipulation that would enhance the process 
of photosynthesis under less than ideal environmental condi-
tions, such as undesirable light. or temperature, lack of ade-
quate water or nutrients, or the presence of toxins. Basically, 
we would then be manipulating the efficiency of the use of 
energy-bY living systems, as they trap and store energy from 
the sun, and consume that energy. This is the fundamental 
mechanism that makes life possible, along with passing the 
code to successive generations. Do we dare enhance it? 
8 
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For Whom Is the Future? 
If the genetic code is dealt out of the deck in increments of 
four nucleotides, the computer code has only two-positive or 
negative, ·on or off, yes or no. 
But we are now to the point where a silicon flake a quarter· 
inch on a side can hold a million electronic components. This 
prodigy draws the power of a nightlight, and in some versions 
performs a million calculations a second. Eventually, one 
billion transistors may be on a single chip. We stand awe-
struck at the speed, size, and capacity of this yes-no poten-
tial, oblivious at that moment to the capacity of our own 
brains. 
Some historian a couple of centuries out may conclude that 
the period of 1910 to 1985 was characterized by the human 
use of cheap energy slaves, and that, starting in 1959 and 
taking off in the 1980's, we massed information slaves. But 
there is something more lurking in computer technology. 
Rather than simply slaving harder than humans, they can now 
work nearly as flexibly and intelligently as humans. Artificial 
intelligence is now discussable. 
We have all read about the things they can or will do so I'd 
rather comment on what I think are some of their implications 
In the context of the other things I'm saying. 
First, it seems to me that the computer charactistics of 
memory, decision-making, and self·adjusting controls enhance 
the ability of the large-scale organizations to make decisions 
and control the environment, as compared to smaller units or 
individuals. It's not so much the price of the computer as it is 
the superstructure that will accompany its adoption. There is 
already evidence of discrepancy in computer availability in 
primary and secondary schools, based on the affluence of the 
school district. Although computers will be available to in· 
dividuals making individual decisions, they will very likely be 
used more effectively in big organizations that can bring 
specialized knowledge in phase with specialized information 
processes. 
Those societies and those Individuals that adapt to the in-
tegrated circu it will have economic advantages over those 
that do not. Economic advantages are not new, but these ap. 
pear potentially more powerful. Furthermore. the Integrated 
circuit is more than the imprint on the Chip. It is the integra-
tion of the information with the decision·making that is impor· 
tant. And software is more than the floppy disc. It Is a pro-
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cess of thinking and communicating. So, it is the process and 
content combined, once again, but this time around in a more 
powerful mode. 
Applied to agriculture, computer awareness could eliminate 
great gobs of risks that we dirt farmers have dwelt with since 
neolithic times, but I think in a different economic structure 
than now exists. 
Not all societies and not all individuals will adapt. There is 
the very real possibility of an increasing gap between the peo-
ple who move into this brave new world and those who do 
not. To date, in talking about the haves and the have-nots, we 
have usually applied the discrepancy to a natural resource, 
such as food, land, minerals, water, health, energy, or in-
dustrial technology. New we are talking about much more 
sophisticated technological control of the environment. There 
is nothing on the political side of life that would guarantee 
distribution of the benefits of the new technologies evenly 
among 9 billion people. 
Indeed, when we look at the course of the new 
technologies combined, we see some changes in the basic 
ways information is shaped and distributed. 
First, there is a shift toward specialization in content and in 
the disciplines. There is a concomitant specialization in the 
associated information. One who seeks or needs to 
generalize, such as a contemporary farmer, must perforce 
rely increasingly on specialists of many different kinds. 
Second, highly specialized information has obvious pro-
prietary value. So individuals, commercial concerns, and even 
governments increase their efforts to keep such information 
exclusive or secret. Even now, public research institutions are 
trying to sort out the codes of ethics for the conflicts imposed 
by the need to publish and disclose and the pecuniary value 
of the discoveries. 
In this setting, information has somewhat broader connota-
tions than either the traditional mass media tuned to news or 
information, or the open-ended market of ideas characteristic 
of adult public education. These have been highly effective in 
the past, and we have made much of the concepts of diffu-
sion of information. But it cannot be taken for granted that in 
this new setting information will emerge like a clear, cool 
spring out of the hillside. The risks become too great. Infor-
mation becomes more tightly programmed and integrated in 
decision-making. It is far less laissez-faire. Those individuals 
or groups who feel buffeted by forces over which they have 
10 
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no control but have access to the new technology will act col-
lectively to reduce the outside forces by increasing the 
amount of information they process. 
Those of us in universities, looking at the growth of such 
areas as computer sciences and computer engineering are 
certainly aware of the trends on the technical (hardware) side. 
And we know where many future students will find employ-
ment, that is, in the technical, in-house service teams. We are 
also keenly aware of the rush with which software is arriving. 
The training we provide in programs like agricultural com-
munications will inevitably respond to the high technology 
trends or the programs will fade away. 
But the larger question is whether the technological 
breakthroughs which are, after all, oriented toward process, 
can really be brought to focus on some of the great substan-
tive issues of our time. 
The projected populations will not be sustained without 
rapid and massive development starting with, but not limited 
to, increased food production. Essential to this will be replace-
ment of currently dominant energy sources with sources that 
do not debilitate or exhaust the environment. All the high 
technology of which we can conceive will not replace the 
minimum per capita need for natural resources, and we will 
continue to address the issue of resource limits to growth so 
abortively attempted by the Club of Rome reports 10 years 
ago, and the Global 2000 report 2 years ago. 
Having said that, it seems to me the great technological 
breakthroughs of our age do indeed bode well for the future. 
There are, I think, some critical conditions that must be 
met. We must demand that technology does not become an 
end in itself. That is, specific technologies must be applied to 
society's problems. It would be easy for them to take off in 
their own updrafts, or be concentrated in such areas as exotic 
military hardware. Need we be reminded that there are now 
nuclear warheads equivalent to 4 tons TNT per capita in the 
world? 
Second, we must work diligently, very diligently, to see that 
the breakthroughs apply broadly, and particularly to the most 
disadvantaged, in spite of the fiscal mania they will tend to 
generate among the more aggressive and more adaptive. 
Andrew W. Hopkins, who was chair of agricultural jour-
nalism at the University of WisconSin-Madison for 37 years, 
wrote a couple of years before his death, "Agricultural experi-
ment stations were created and are supported to carry on 
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research of value, interest and service both to farmers and 
the general public. However, during the early years of those 
institutions, in this and other states, there was no systematic 
effort to make sure that the findings of the scientists would 
reach either the farmer or the general public." 
Now the stage is larger, the risks are greater, the research 
is more potent. But the basic social issue is the same. 
Quoting Hopkins again, "Democracy will live where there is 
free circulation of dependable information." 
I would not place all the future burden of proof for that on 
one small group of agricultural journalists, but I think this 
group has some characteristics that make it different from any 
other communicators. We have not been, and will not be, 
passive reflectors of events, like mirrors on the wall. 
We have understood the relationship between process and 
content and have dealt with meaning, as well as with 
comprehension. 
We have the talent and the will to proceed. 
12 
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